More Than Just Good Passwords? A Study on Usability and Security
  Perceptions of Risk-based Authentication by Wiefling, Stephan et al.
More Than Just Good Passwords? A Study on Usability and
Security Perceptions of Risk-based Authentication
Stephan Wiefling
H-BRS University of Applied Sciences
Ruhr University Bochum
stephan.wiefling@h-brs.de
Markus Dürmuth
Ruhr University Bochum
Bochum, Germany
markus.duermuth@rub.de
Luigi Lo Iacono
H-BRS University of Applied Sciences
Sankt Augustin, Germany
luigi.lo_iacono@h-brs.de
ABSTRACT
Risk-based Authentication (RBA) is an adaptive security measure
to strengthen password-based authentication. RBA monitors ad-
ditional features during login, and when observed feature values
differ significantly from previously seen ones, users have to pro-
vide additional authentication factors such as a verification code.
RBA has the potential to offer more usable authentication, but the
usability and the security perceptions of RBA are not studied well.
We present the results of a between-group lab study (n=65) to
evaluate usability and security perceptions of two RBA variants, one
2FA variant, and password-only authentication. Our study shows
with significant results that RBA is considered to be more usable
than the studied 2FA variants, while it is perceived as more secure
than password-only authentication in general and comparably se-
cure to 2FA in a variety of application types. We also observed RBA
usability problems and provide recommendations for mitigation.
Our contribution provides a first deeper understanding of the users’
perception of RBA and helps to improve RBA implementations for
a broader user acceptance.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Security and privacy→ Authentication; Usability in secu-
rity and privacy.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Weaknesses in password-based authentication have been known
for a long time [5, 11, 14, 18, 33, 47, 48]. Over the last few years,
large-scale password database leaks [11] and intelligent password-
guessing attacks [48] even revealed new threats for password-based
authentication on the internet. Nevertheless, passwords are still
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the predominant authentication mechanism deployed by online
services today [6, 35].
Website owners must implement additional measures to improve
account security and to protect their users. Many online services
offer Two-factor Authentication (2FA) as such a measure [35]. How-
ever, 2FA proved to be unpopular among users. Although Google
introduced and keeps promoting 2FA since 2011 [43], less than 10%
of all active Google users had 2FA enabled in January 2018 [31].
Potential reasons for the low adoption rates could lie in increased
burden introduced by continuous demand for two distinct authen-
tication steps [29] as well as privacy concerns [46]. Risk-based
Authentication (RBA) [19] is an approach which improves account
security with minimal impact on user interaction. Therefore, RBA
has the potential to increase password security without degrading
usability.
1.1 Risk-based Authentication (RBA)
RBA is typically used in addition to password-based authentication.
It protects against a rather strong attacker that either knows the
correct login credentials (username and password) or is able to guess
the correct credentials with a low number of guesses. Examples
include credential stuffing [49], phishing [14], or online guessing
attacks [48]. During password entry, the online servicemonitors and
records additional features that are available in the context. Possible
features range from network or device information to biometrics.
Based on these features, a risk score is estimated which is typically
classified into three risk classes (low, medium, high) [19, 24, 32].
Based on the risk score and its classification, the online service can
perform several actions. If the risk is considered low (e.g., common
device, location, and time), access is granted. On a medium risk (e.g.,
unknown device at a usual location and time), the service typically
requests additional information to confirm the claimed identity
(e.g., verification of email address [19, 25, 44]). If the risk score is
considered high (e.g., unknown device at unrealistic location and
uncommon time), the service can block access. This should be a rare
event, however, since it will not allow users who are mistakenly
classified as a high risk to access their account.
Varying both the exact computation of the risk score and the
thresholds separating low, medium, and high risk gives a whole
spectrum of variants of RBA. At one end of the spectrum, for an
extremely strict risk estimation, re-authentication is requested for
every login attempt, thus the system appears to users just as 2FA.
At the other end of the spectrum, for a very insensitive risk engine,
re-authentication is never requested, thus the system appears just
as password-only authentication. Sensible implementations of RBA
are located between those extremes, and require re-authentication
only for a fraction of the login attempts. In our study, we will
1
ar
X
iv
:2
01
0.
00
33
9v
1 
 [c
s.C
R]
  1
 O
ct 
20
20
ACSAC 2020, December 7–11, 2020, Austin, USA Stephan Wiefling, Markus Dürmuth, and Luigi Lo Iacono
compare two variants of RBA with these alternatives in order to be
able to compare across this spectrum.
RBA should not be confused with Implicit Authentication (IA)
[27], which describes password-less continuous authentication on
mobile devices via behavioral biometrics.
The adoption of RBA is still rather limited to few mostly large
online services [4, 25, 31, 50]. Only five popular online services
used RBA in spring 2018 [50]. The recommendation by the NIST
digital identity guidelines [21] and related research are expected to
contribute to a broader usage.
1.2 Research Questions
The adoption of new approaches and technologies depends on
many factors. Among these factors are the usability and security
perceptions [3]. Despite its potential and increasing importance,
the usability and security perceptions of RBA were not evaluated
in literature to date. To learn more about these perceptions, we
formulated the following research questions. These questions can
help to provide answers on how RBA is perceived compared to
password-only authentication and equivalent 2FA variants, and if
it has the potential to compensate the low adoption rates of 2FA.
Usability perceptions:
U1: a) How does the usage of RBA affect the user acceptance
compared to 2FA?
b) How does the frequency of asking for re-authentication
affect the user acceptance of RBA?
U2: a) How does the usage of RBA affect the usability regarding
the System Usability Scale (SUS) [7] compared to 2FA?
b) How does the usability of RBA compare to password-only
authentication regarding the SUS?
U3: In which context (data to provide, type of website) do users
accept RBA?
U4: Do users understand why they occasionally have to re-authen-
ticate with RBA?
Security perceptions:
S1: a) How does the security perception of RBA compare to the
security perception of 2FA?
b) How does the usage of RBA affect the security perception
compared to password-only authentication?
S2: a) How does the perceived level of protection of RBA compare
to the perceived level of protection of 2FA?
b) How does the usage of RBA affect the perceived level of
protection compared to the perceived level of protection of
password-only authentication?
S3: In which contexts do users feel protected with RBA?
1.3 Contributions
We designed and conducted a between-group lab study with 65
participants and four conditions to evaluate usability and security
perceptions of RBA. We compared our results with password-only
authentication and a 2FA variant. In general, RBA was perceived
significantly more secure than password-only authentication. We
identified use cases where users significantly preferred RBA over
the studied 2FA variants in terms of usability, while having simi-
lar security perceptions for both authentication methods. We also
show that the way RBA is implemented has an effect on the user
acceptance. Beyond that, we discovered potential usability prob-
lems that could have a negative effect on the RBA user experience
if not addressed by the RBA implementation appropriately.
Our work supports website owners in deciding which authenti-
cation method (2FA, RBA, password-only) fits best to the applica-
tion scenario of their corresponding website. Moreover, our work
helps developers to understand how to strengthen password-based
authentication without degrading usability. It also provides indica-
tions on how to improve the user experience of existing RBA solu-
tions. Finally, researchers obtain insights on how RBA is perceived
by users and how this perception compares to other widespread
authentication methods.
2 STUDY
To examine and compare different website authentication methods,
we created a lab study based on a specifically developed website.
The website’s functionalities were similar to the ones provided by
online storage services like Dropbox, Google Drive, or Nextcloud.
After registration, the participant obtained personal storage on the
website. The participant could upload, download, share, and delete
files. Also, the participant had the possibility to take pictures via
webcam. These functionalities enabled us to test a website on which
participants share and experience sensitive data.
Before accessing the website, the participants were required
to log in. After submitting the login credentials, each participant
perceived one of these four authentication methods (depending on
the assigned condition):
(i) 2FA: The participant was prompted for additional authentica-
tion after each successful password entry. More specifically,
the participant was requested to enter a security code that was
sent to the participant’s email address.
(ii) RBA-DEVICE (RBA-DEV): The participant was prompted for
re-authentication via email, as in the 2FA condition, but only
in cases where the device used for logging in was never used
before by the user.
(iii) RBA-LOCATION (RBA-LOC): The participant was prompted
for re-authentication via email, as in the 2FA condition, but
only in cases where the device’s location was never seen before
for this user.
(iv) PASSWORD-ONLY (PW-ONLY): The participant was not
prompted for any additional authentication at all.
We chose these four methods and the re-authentication via email
based on our own observations on the state-of-the-art deployments
regarding RBA and other popular authentication methods [50]. We
assumed that the perception of RBA is dependent on its implemen-
tation. Since most of the RBA deployments checked for either the
device itself or the location of the device, we decided to test the
RBA variations RBA-DEV and RBA-LOC.
2.1 Design Decisions
Testing RBA in a usability study is difficult for a number of rea-
sons: (i) RBA is not standardized at the moment. Thus, currently
deployed RBA solutions differ widely in dialog design and imple-
mentation [50]. (ii) Fundamental properties of RBA are based on
user behavior. Using another device or geolocation will have an
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(a) 2FA condition (b) RBA-{LOC,DEV} condition
Figure 1: Re-authentication dialogs presented to the study
participants for the different login procedures
effect on the RBA experience. (iii) Also, testing location changes is a
challenge for a controlled lab study. (iv) RBA differs from 2FA only
in cases where login patterns (e.g., location or device) have been
used for the login before. To compare RBA with 2FA, participants
need to experience a difference between these two authentication
methods.
We addressed all these issues in our study design. We decided to
conduct a between-group lab study, including device and location
changes, to observe user reactions under controlled conditions. We
involved personal devices to create a realistic study scenario.
We created a generic RBA solution representing state-of-the-art
deployments. We decided that our study website requested RBA
re-authentication by code-based email address verification since
the majority of all online services studied in previous work offered
it [50]. Online services may offer several 2FA methods in practice,
ranging from biometrics to app or code-based solutions. We focused
on code-based 2FA via email to ensure comparability with state-
of-the-art RBA solutions. The resulting dialog for RBA-LOC and
RBA-DEV (see Figure 1b) as well as the sent verification emails
were based on the RBA dialogs of Amazon, Facebook, GOG.com,
Google, LinkedIn, and Microsoft. The 2FA dialog (see Figure 1a) is
similar to the dialog of LinkedIn. We tried to keep the differences
between both dialogs at a minimum to mitigate that (completely)
different dialog texts could bias the participant’s rating in the 2FA
and RBA conditions.
2.2 Study Design
As the studied authentication methods differ in the login procedure,
we required our participants to log in several times. They were
asked to solve seven tasks on the study website. In these tasks, the
participants logged in and out on the website in two different loca-
tions using three different devices (2x desktop, 1x mobile device). As
a consequence, the participants experienced the corresponding au-
thentication method of the study condition, i.e., participants were
asked for re-authentication once (RBA-LOC), twice (RBA-DEV),
seven times (2FA), or not at all (PW-ONLY).
We designed the tasks to create an atmosphere where sensitive
data is stored and shared on the user account, i.e., confidential com-
pany documents and taking a personal picture. Note that pictures
are considered more sensitive in Europe compared to other conti-
nents [41]. We assumed that with increased sensitive and personal
data, including using a personal email account and laptop, this
would increase the participant’s immersion into the study scenario.
We made this assumption as it is a common observation when
studying user authentication that the perceived account value has
an influence on user’s actions and perceptions.
We introduced two room changes during the study to simulate
a change of physical location. To strengthen the impression of
a location change, both rooms had a very different appearance.
Room A looked like a typical office room, with white wall and grey
furniture colors. Room B, our usability lab, looked similar to a living
room or hotel room and had warm wall and furniture colors to
create a pleasant atmosphere.
2.3 Study Setup
The between-group lab study consisted of four conditions: 2FA,
RBA-DEV, RBA-LOC, and PW-ONLY. All participants were ran-
domly assigned to one of the four conditions while balancing gen-
ders in each group as far as possible. The study consisted of three
stages (task solving, exit survey, and semi-structured interview).
The study website was reachable via HTTPS at an internet domain
name not connected with our university to mitigate social desirabil-
ity bias and to increase perceived data sensitivity, i.e., participants
don’t know where the data is stored.
The study conductor stayed outside in an observation room next
to the study rooms. The conductor could observe the participants’
facial reactions as well as display contents of the devices inside
room B via a streamed video recording.
After solving the tasks, participants answered a survey on a
tablet PC. The survey covered five-point Likert scale questions
on usability and security perceptions of the login procedure. We
integrated several measures into the survey to mitigate known
biases and to check the quality of our results (see Section 2.3.3).
After the survey, we conducted a semi-structured interview
with the participants to gain qualitative feedback on both impres-
sions and personal experiences regarding the tested authentication
method. We describe the three study stages in detail below.
2.3.1 Study Procedure. The study started in room A to introduce a
typical use case scenario for our participants. The room contained
the task sheet, a USB flash drive (containing a presentation and
meeting minutes), and a button to call the study conductor in case of
questions or support. The study conductors introduced the website
as an external cloud storage service. After signing the consent form,
the study conductor made it clear to the participants that there
were no “right” or “wrong” answers or actions, and that we test
the website not the participants. We did all this to mitigate social
desirability bias and to make our participants feel comfortable. The
participants were asked to think aloud during the tasks in order
to obtain qualitative feedback, especially while they experienced
the re-authentication. To mitigate fatigue biases, we designed the
study to keep the required time for each of the three study stages
low (15-20 minutes). All study conductors followed a study script
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Table 1: Overview of the study tasks and when re-
authentication was requested for RBA-LOC, RBA-DEV and
2FA conditions. No re-authentication was requested for the
PW-ONLY condition. Room A and the laptop are known to
the RBA system as a common context.
# Task Room Device Re-authentication requested
RBA-LOC RBA-DEV 2FA
1 Register A Laptop # #  
2 File Upload A Laptop # #  
3 File Download B Desktop PC    
4 Open Report B Desktop PC # #  
5 Take Picture B Desktop PC # #  
6 Open File B Tablet PC #   
7 Delete Data A Laptop # #  
 Requested # Not requested
containing all instructions and required materials. All study tasks
were printed on sheets of paper, one for each task. The participants
turned to the next sheet as soon as each task was completed.
2.3.2 Study Tasks. Participants were asked to bring their private
laptop and, if required for accessing personal email, their smart-
phones to the study. We informed the participants that they were
required to use their personal email address for registration on the
study website. To avoid bias, we did not mention that this email
address was possibly also used for authentication purposes.
The tasks were designed to represent typical situations in work-
ing life. Table 1 gives an overview of the tasks and when re-authenti-
cation was requested in which condition. Note that some real-world
online services trigger RBA with slight changes of the IP address,
even at the same geolocation [50]. Since all devices involved had
individual IP addresses in the study, the tested scenarios are realistic
ones.
After the study conductor left the room, the participants solved
two tasks using their private laptop in room A. The tasks introduced
the story that the participants are preparing for a meeting at an
external business partner. Following that, they registered on the
study website (task one), and uploaded a presentation and meeting
minutes (task two).
After the two tasks, the participants were asked to leave the room,
leaving their personal laptop inside the room. Room A was locked
and the participants were brought into room B. The workplace was
a desk containing a desktop PC (Windows 10 and Chrome browser)
with a display, a webcam mounted on it, keyboard and mouse as
well as a button to call the study conductor. A tablet PC (Asus
Nexus 7, Android 6.0.1 with Chrome browser) was hidden inside
the right drawer of the desk. The study conductor left the room
and the participants solved three tasks on the desktop PC.
In task three, the participants imagined that they traveled close
to the business partner but forgot their laptop at home. Therefore,
they entered a (fictional) internet cafe to download the presenta-
tion (uploaded during task two) on a USB flash drive. We chose
this task to make our participants log in at an unknown device
at an unknown location. In task four, the participants (i) opened
a business report (marked as confidential), shared by colleagues
on the website, (ii) looked for a quarterly figure in this report and
(iii) sent this figure with their personal email client to the email
address of a (fictional) business partner. We chose the task to make
the participants get in contact with sensitive data. In task five, a
colleague requested a portrait picture for a company presentation,
so the participants took and shared a picture of themselves with
this colleague. We chose this task to make our participants share
personal data. In task six, the participants (i) got the tablet PC out
of the drawer and (ii) opened the meeting minutes on the tablet PC
to prepare for the meeting with the business partner. We chose this
task to make our participants log in at an unknown device at the
same location.
After the task, the participants were brought to room A again
and solved the final task seven on their laptop. In this task, the
participants arrived at home again and deleted the personal data
and the user account from the website. We chose this task to make
our participants log in at a familiar device at a familiar location
(and especially for those in the RBA conditions: to experience that
the website recognized them in this common context).
2.3.3 Exit Survey. Following the tasks, participants answered a sur-
vey on a tablet PC to provide quantitative feedback on the authen-
tication methods. The survey consisted of five-point Likert scale
questions regarding the user’s usability and security perceptions.
We balanced all survey questions to mitigate social desirability
bias [42]. The order of questions and subquestions varied randomly
for each participant to randomly distribute ordering effects [26].
Also, the Likert scale direction varied for a randomly selected half
of participants in each condition to randomly distribute response
order bias [8, 23].
The first part of the survey consisted of two SUS question-
naires [7]. We changed the word “system” in these questionnaires
to “website” and “login procedure” respectively to explicitly evalu-
ate the usability of the website and the perceived authentication
method. We added the SUS questions with the website wording
since we briefed our participants that we test a website. The ap-
proach to change the SUS wordings is similar to Khan et al. [27]. In
contrast to them, we left SUS item five1 inside our questionnaires
since we tested a visible user interface. We calculated the SUS score
as defined in Brooke [7]. The SUS questionnaire contains atten-
tion checks in the form of pairs of related questions with opposite
wording to verify the quality of our results.
The second part of the survey contained questions on the per-
sonal perceptions of the authentication method. Questions ranged
from the perceived security and level of protection to the percep-
tion and acceptance of the corresponding login method (general
and on specific types of websites). Members of the 2FA and RBA
conditions also answered questions on understanding, perception,
and acceptance of the re-authentication (general and in specific
scenarios). We omitted the re-authentication questions for the PW-
ONLY condition since the members of this condition were not asked
for re-authentication in the study. Some of the survey questions
were based on Agarwal et al. [2] and Khan et al. [27]. However,
we balanced all of these questions since we found that the original
questions could bias participants due to their one-sided, non-neutral
wording (e.g., “How annoying were ...” [27] or “How obstructive
1“I found the various functions in this system were well integrated”
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was ...” [2]). We chose the uniform wording “login method” inside
the questions instead of the terms “scheme” [2] and “method” [27]
since we found this wording easier to understand for our partici-
pants.
The survey concluded with basic demographical questions.
2.3.4 Semi-structured Interview. Following the exit survey, we con-
ducted a semi-structured interview with the participants. We told
them that they would not have to answer a question if they did
not want to. At the beginning, we asked website-related questions
to distract from our actual purpose of the study. Then, we asked
questions regarding the login procedure to gain insights on how
participants perceived the corresponding authentication method.
These questions ranged from likes and dislikes of the login method,
their desired changes and security perceptions to suggestions for
alternative authentication methods. Members of the 2FA and RBA
conditions were additionally asked to explain the login procedure
in their own words and to share their personal experiences with
similar login procedures. We did this to verify whether they un-
derstood why they were asked for re-authentication. Similar to the
exit survey, we took some of the questions by Khan et al. [27] and
Agarwal et al. [2] into consideration.
2.4 Data Collection
To answer our research questions, we collected the following data:
(i) Audio and Video:We recorded a video of the participant’s face
inside room B as well as the screen content of desktop and mobile
device (tablet PC). Personal data was automatically censored on the
video recording. We also recorded audio of the participant while
thinking aloud. (ii) Authentication Time:We recorded the time
needed to authenticate on the study website. For this reason, the
website stored timestamps of when the first character was entered
into the login form and the first page was loaded in logged in state.
We calculated the authentication time as the difference between the
two values. (iii) Exit Survey: The survey answers were collected
and stored digitally after finishing the survey. (iv) Semi-structured
Interview:We recorded the questions and answers as audio files
and transcribed them afterwards.
2.5 Ethical Considerations
We discovered potential ethical issues while planning the study.
Below, we describe these issues and how we addressed them.
2.5.1 Personal Data on Video. When requested for re-authentica-
tion, participants had to log into their personal email account to
open the re-authentication email. However, there was a risk that
contents of other emails were recorded on video when deciding to
open this email on the desktop PC. Also, personal email addresses
and passwords could have been recorded.
To solve this issue, we developed an automatic process to hide
personal data from the video recording and stream: The video
content was censored automatically (white bar across the entire
video) whenever (i) a login form was visible or (ii) our study website
was not focused. As a result, login data as well as contents of other
browser tabs (e.g., the email account) were neither recorded on
video nor visible on the video stream. We tested and improved
the automatic process over a three week period. We did this to
make sure that all device and browser-based use cases are covered,
making our process as accurate as possible.
We briefed the participants explicitly about this automatic pro-
cedure before the study to make them feel comfortable. We also
offered the participants to view and inspect the recorded video after
the study and to request deletion of the video. One participant made
use of that possibility, which underlines that this is an important
ethical consideration.
2.5.2 “Deception”. We instructed the participants before the study
that we evaluate a website. We did not disclose them at the time
that we were actually testing authentication methods. However,
since the authentication was also part of the website, we considered
this deception to be non-critical. We debriefed the participants after
the study and revealed them the real purpose of the study.
2.5.3 Further Precautions. Besides the automatic process to cen-
sor personally identifiable information (PII) on video, we offered
our participants additional privacy and pseudonymity, includ-
ing among others: (i) Login data: The login credentials, hashed
with scrypt [34], as well as the picture were only stored during the
study and deleted afterwards. (ii) Non-linkability of PII: After
deletion of email address and password, the participants could only
be identified by a random sequence of characters and numbers (to-
ken). (iii) Storage: All study data was stored on encrypted external
mobile hard drives. Only the study conductors had the decryption
password, i.e., access to this hard drive.
The participants were informed by all these procedures and
signed a consent form (informed consent). Participants were in-
formed that they could withdraw the study anytime. All survey
questions offered a “don’t know” option.
We did not have a formal IRB process at TH Köln, where we
conducted this study. But besides our ethical considerations above,
we made sure to minimize potential harm by complying with the
ethics code of the German Sociological Association (DGS) as well
as the standards of good scientific practice of the German Research
Foundation (DFG). We also made sure to comply with the terms of
the EU General Data Protection Regulation.
2.6 Piloting
We piloted the study with three participants to verify and optimize
our study procedure. In contrast to the final study, we asked the
participants to think aloud while answering the exit survey. This
helped us to understand how participants interpret the context
of the survey questions. Minor adjustments to survey question
wordings were done as a result of piloting.
2.7 Recruiting
Our study required participants using online services with private
data. Knowledge in neither 2FA nor RBA was not required. We
recruited participants via emails sent to mailing lists of faculties
in social sciences, biology, medicine, and humanities of Univer-
sity of Cologne, and architecture, communication sciences, and
engineering faculties of TH Köln. We also put up posters in the
corresponding university faculties and advertised on a local radio
station targeting a young audience to recruit for the study. We did
this to investigate a broad sample of digital natives. We took care
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and selected only participants that did not attend any information
security lectures to mitigate bias. We mentioned in the recruiting
email and poster that the study is about testing a website and that
the study lasts about one hour (i.e., 3 · 20 minutes). Among all
participants we drew six Amazon gift cards worth 25e each. We
also offered candy bars and drinks for the participants’ personal
well-being during the study.
3 RESULTS
The study took place between December 2018 and February 2020
and was completed with 65 participants (17 in the PW-ONLY con-
dition, 16 each in the three other conditions). 68 participated but
three of them experienced problems with the website or forgot to
log out between tasks, which is why they were excluded from the
results. The participants were between 19 and 33 years old (mean:
24.57, SD: 3.22). 17 participants were female, 47 were male, and one
chose not to state the gender. RBA-DEV had five female partici-
pants, all remaining conditions had four female participants. All
study sessions lasted 50 minutes at a maximum.
For the survey data, we used Kruskal-Wallis (K-W) tests for the
omnibus cases and Dunn’s multiple comparison test with Bonfer-
roni correction (Dunn-Bonferroni) for post-hoc analysis. For the
timing comparison (with and without re-authentication), we used
Mann-Whitney-U (MWU) tests to compare the statistical differ-
ence between the two conditions. We set 0.05 as our threshold for
statistical significance (i.e., p<0.05 is significant).
For the semi-structured interview, we pattern-coded the respon-
ses using inductive coding: The answers were read and observed
patterns were added to the codebook. After that, the answers were
coded into the patterns independently by two researchers of our
research group. If both researchers coded an answer differently, a
third researcher did the final decision. For the coding, we achieved
Cohen’s Kappa 𝜅 = 0.82, which is within the acceptable range of
coding agreement [30].
Below, we present the qualitative and quantitative study results
ordered by our research questions. A discussion follows after pre-
senting the results of each research question.
3.1 Usability Perceptions
In this section, we compare the usability of the studied RBA, 2FA,
and password-only authentication schemes. Besides the general
user acceptance, we identify contexts in which users prefer RBA to
2FA and investigate whether users understand RBA’s re-authentica-
tion requests.
3.1.1 User Acceptance and SUS (U1, U2). In the exit survey, the
participants responded to several questions regarding the accep-
tance of the corresponding login method (see Figure 2). There were
no significant differences between PW-ONLY and the other three
conditions. However, the participants perceived RBA significantly
less annoying than 2FA (RBA-LOC/2FA: p=0.001; RBA-DEV/2FA:
p=0.0022). The participants also found RBA-LOC significantly less
tiring than 2FA (p=0.0122) and its interruptions significantly less an-
noying than those of 2FA (p=0.0331). The majority of the RBA and
2FA participants agreed with the question of whether they would
use their login procedure. RBA-LOC group members, who had to
do less re-authentication than those of RBA-DEV and 2FA, gave
How annoying or not annoying did you perceive this login procedure?
How tiring or not-tiring did you find this login procedure?
How did you perceive the interruptions for confirming the identity?
(U1a)
(U1b)
(U1c)
Would you use this login procedure?(U1d)
Figure 2: Responses to the user acceptance questions (U1)
PW-ONLY RBA-LOC RBA-DEV 2FA
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Figure 3: Login procedure usability (U2): Box plot showing
the SUS score results for the study conditions. PW-ONLY and
RBA-DEV received significantly higher scores than 2FA.
significantly higher ratings than those of RBA-DEV and 2FA regard-
ing that question (RBA-DEV/RBA-LOC: p=0.026; RBA-DEV/2FA:
p=0.0117).
The participants also answered two adjusted SUS surveys. The
surveys contained questions about the authentication method and
the study website respectively.
With a median SUS score above 80, the PW-ONLY and RBA au-
thentication methods can be considered grade A usability [40] (see
Figure 3). With a median SUS score of 76.25, 2FA can be considered
grade B usability. The SUS scores of PW-ONLY and RBA-DEV are
significantly higher than those of 2FA (see Table 2). PW-ONLY,
RBA-LOC, and RBA-DEV also received significantly more positive
ratings than 2FA in some of the SUS questions: Participants rated
2FA significantly more cumbersome to use and significantly more
unnecessarily complex compared to PW-ONLY and both RBA con-
ditions. Participants would use both RBA variations significantly
more frequently than 2FA. PW-ONLY was rated significantly easier
to use than 2FA.
Concluding the results, the user acceptance of RBA is in some
cases significantly higher than 2FA. For the remaining cases, the
user acceptance of RBA is not significantly lower than 2FA. In
addition, RBA-DEV is perceived significantly more usable than 2FA
regarding the SUS score. RBA-LOC and RBA-DEV are perceived
significantly more usable than 2FA regarding the answers of the
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Table 2: Significant (bold) K-W and Dunn-Bonferroni p-
values for the SUS score and SUS questions. We excluded p-
values greater than 0.2.
2FA/ 2FA/ 2FA/ RBA-L/
K-W PW RBA-L RBA-D RBA-D
SUS score 0.0030 0.0093 0.0523 0.0073 -
Use more frequently 0.0041 - 0.0185 0.0078 -
Unnecessarily complex 0.0003 0.0005 0.0420 0.0026 -
Easy to use 0.0054 0.0034 0.1084 0.0964 -
Cumbersome to use 0.0002 0.0005 0.0049 0.0027 -
SUS questions. As the main difference of the studied schemes is the
amount and frequency of required authentication, we conclude that
less requests for re-authentication are accepted significantly higher
than more of them. Since PW-ONLY also received a significantly
more positive rating than 2FA, RBA is comparable to password-
only authentication regarding the SUS score and parts of the SUS
question answers.
Discussion: RBA participants were asked less often for re-authen-
tication than those of 2FA. We conclude that this was the main rea-
son why RBA and PW-ONLY outweighed 2FA in terms of usability
and user acceptance, as 2FA participants mentioned this as well:
“It was very cumbersome to log in to the email account
every time. Especially, if you are not at your own com-
puter, but somewhere else.” (P15)
When asked for re-authentication, participants needed signifi-
cantly more time to authenticate than without re-authentication,
due to the requested additional step (MWU: U=1358.5; p≪0.0001,
without: mean=8 s; median=10.98 s; SD=8.49 s, with: mean=59.22 s;
median=42 s; SD=55.1 s). Therefore, frequent logins increased the to-
tal authentication time and decreased usability and user acceptance.
One participant of RBA-DEV mentioned this in the semi-structured
interview:
“[I liked that] when I was using the same device that I
didn’t have to authenticate twice by email.” (P36)
Our results matched findings of Khan et al. [27] as well as Craw-
ford and Renaud [10] related to the fact that more interruptions
for authentication were perceived as more annoying. They confirm
findings of Reese et al. [38] and Acemyan et al. [1] regarding that
code-based 2FA received SUS scores lower than or equal 80. In
relation to Reese et al. we can also confirm that the code-based 2FA
SUS scores are lower than those of password-only authentication.
The results also reflect findings of Zimmermann and Gerber [52]
regarding that password-only authentication received high ratings
in terms of usability.
All participants had to enter their login credentials in every task,
including those of PW-ONLY. Since there was no additional se-
curity measure in this condition, PW-ONLY participants did not
understand why they had to enter the credentials every time. This
explains the slightly increased, but not significant, ratings for an-
noying (U1a) and the lower outliers in the SUS scores (U2).
Table 3: Significant (bold) K-W and Dunn-Bonferroni p-
values for context-based user acceptance. We excluded p-
values greater than 0.2.
2FA/ 2FA/ RBA-L/
K-W RBA-L RBA-D RBA-D
Email Social network 0.0457 0.1945 0.0580 -
News website 0.0034 - 0.0029 0.0491
Email/ Email/ Phone/
Phone App App
Online shop RBA-LOC 0.0137 0.0156 0.0848 -
RBA-DEV 0.0096 0.0186 0.0314 -
Email service RBA-LOC 0.0120 0.0091 - -
Social network RBA-LOC 0.0052 0.0040 0.1181 -
RBA-DEV <0.0001 <0.0001 0.0123 -
2FA 0.0114 0.0102 0.1377 -
Online storage RBA-LOC 0.0031 0.0022 - 0.1547
RBA-DEV 0.0298 0.0527 0.0763 -
Video website RBA-LOC 0.0038 0.0034 0.0606 -
RBA-DEV 0.0003 0.0005 0.0030 -
2FA 0.0072 0.0084 0.0585 -
News website RBA-LOC 0.0398 0.0336 - -
RBA-DEV <0.0001 <0.0001 0.0015 -
3.1.2 Context-based User Acceptance (U3). Participants of the RBA
and 2FA conditions rated their willingness to use their login pro-
cedure if they had to (i) provide their email address or (ii) mobile
phone number, or (iii) had to install an authenticator app on their
smartphone. The rating was given for seven different types of web-
sites. Based on our classification, the website types ranged from
payment data (online banking, online shopping) and personal data
(email provider, social network, online storage) to less personal
data (video website, comment function on a news website).
On both RBA and 2FA conditions, the results showed a gen-
eral higher acceptance for email than for mobile phone number or
authenticator app. In the context of online banking, this general
high acceptance retained for providing a mobile phone number or
installing an authenticator app as well (see Figure 4). In the follow-
ing, we present an excerpt of our results. All significant results are
displayed in Table 3. Appendix D contains all results.
Email: Except for the news websites, the responses showed
a general acceptance for all three authentication schemes when
having to provide the email address. RBA-DEV was significantly
higher accepted than 2FA and RBA-LOC in the context of news
website.
Phone number: In all website categories, except for online
banking, the acceptance to provide the phone number was signifi-
cantly lower than for email to some extent. Providing the phone
number was significantly less accepted than email for video website
and for social network in all three conditions.
App: For RBA-DEV, the general acceptance to install an authen-
ticator app was lower than providing the email address. Differences
between app and email were significant in the contexts of video
websites, news websites, online shops, and social networks.
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Social network
Online banking
Figure 4: Context-based user acceptance (U3) responses for
websites with different types of sensitive personal data in-
volved (online banking and social network)
Discussion: The results indicate that there is a willingness to
provide the mobile phone number for RBA or 2FA if very sensitive
personal data or payment data is involved on a website. These
results partly reflect Redmiles et al.’s [37], Reynolds et al.’s [39], and
Dutson et al.’s [16] observations regarding the accepted use of 2FA
for only financial or sensitive data. However, personal trust in the
online service seemed to be equally important, too:
“[I’m not providing my phone number] because [then]
different websites, for example via social media, can still
reach me [...]. I made experiences in the past where I
was partly spammed. I received some curious messages,
although I only wanted to log in in a secure way.” (P17)
Another explanation why users rejected to provide their mobile
phone number on some websites was that phone numbers were
regarded as more sensitive data than email addresses [41]:
“If someone calls me, this is a closer contact for me than
if someone writes me an email.” (P38)
Another possible factor influencing the acceptance of RBA and
2FA was the device on which the online service was mainly used.
Video websites like Netflix or YouTube could be used on smart
TVs as well. One participant had experiences in which the re-
authentication was found annoying:
“because [...] I want to log in quickly and watch some-
thing now. On other devices I’m at the computer anyway
and don’t expect a problem, that I just go into the email
account and get the token. As I said, on Netflix [...] you
do more on the TV [...] and then it’s just critical.” (P31)
Additionally, for accepting RBA or 2FA on a website, users seem-
ingly expected a certain value to be protected (e.g., access to per-
sonal data, identity theft protection). This explains why themajority
of participants rejected RBA and 2FA for the comment function on
a news website.
3.1.3 Understanding Re-Authentication (U4). Participants of RBA
and 2FA conditions rated whether or not they understood the re-
authentication. The large majority of all participants understood
the re-authentication.
Discussion: Most of the RBA participants (RBA-LOC: 13/16, RBA-
DEV: 15/16) mentioned in the semi-structured interview that this
re-authentication step came after something in the behavior had
changed, i.e., device or location. These results support the thesis,
that the majority of all participants understood the sporadic re-
authentication and associated it with changing situational settings.
3.2 Security Perceptions
In this section we evaluate and compare the security perception
and perceived level of protection of the studied RBA, 2FA, and
password-only authentication variants. We also identify contexts
in which users feel adequately protected by RBA.
3.2.1 Security Perception (S1). All participants rated the overall
security of their authentication method in the exit survey. The
results (see Figure 5) show that participants of RBA and 2FA rated
their authentication method significantly more secure than those of
PW-ONLY (RBA-LOC/PW-ONLY: p=0.0013, RBA-DEV/PW-ONLY:
p=0.0017, 2FA/PW-ONLY: p=0.0002). The differences between 2FA
and both RBA conditions were not significant. Concluding the
results, the security perception of RBA, if triggered, is significantly
higher than password-only authentication and comparable to 2FA.
Discussion: Participants of the two RBA conditions considered
their respective authentication method as secure, since they as-
sumed that attackers would need access to personal devices or their
email accounts for a successful login:
“I assume that [strangers] have no access to devices on
which I have already confirmed my identity. That’s why
I think the security is quite good” (P6)
“[Unknown persons] don’t really have a chance to access
my computer or my mobile phone. Therefore, actually
no chance to get the security code. [They] Must have
hacked my email account somehow.” (P13)
3.2.2 Level of Protection (S2). Participants rated how they per-
ceived the level of protection offered by the corresponding au-
thentication method (see Figure 5). Participants of RBA and 2FA
conditions were significantly more satisfied with the level of protec-
tion compared to those of the PW-ONLY condition (RBA-LOC/PW-
ONLY: p=0.0126, RBA-DEV/PW-ONLY: p=0.0113, 2FA/PW-ONLY:
p<0.0001). There were no significant differences between 2FA and
both RBA conditions. In conclusion, participants felt significantly
more protected with RBA and 2FA than with password-only authen-
tication. Also, RBA is comparable to 2FA regarding the perceived
level of protection.
Discussion: We assume that the re-authentication played a major
role for the high sense of protection. When getting into detail, all
of the 2FA and RBA participants named the re-authentication as
the reason for feeling protected. Examples:
8
More Than Just Good Passwords? A Study on Usability and Security Perceptions of Risk-based Authentication ACSAC 2020, December 7–11, 2020, Austin, USA
How do you rate the overall security of the login procedure?
How satisfied or unsatisfied are you with the level of protection which
is offered by the login procedure?
(S1)
(S2)
Figure 5: Participant responses for security perception (S1)
and level of protection (S2). PW-ONLY participants gave sig-
nificantly lower ratings than those of the other conditions.
“The confirmation with the email address makes it feel
safer.[...] especially [when] it is checked again on other
PCs and [one] cannot log in directly with the password
and login name. And still kept simple, I found.” (P27)
“[I felt] very secure. [...] Especially because of this con-
firmation email (laughs), which actually annoys you,
but by doing so [...] you notice that somehow maybe a
bit more security is set.” (P39)
We conclude that RBA has to be visible to users to increase
security perceptions compared to password-only authentication.
3.2.3 Context-based Level of Protection (S3). All participants rated
their satisfaction with the level of protection if the corresponding
authentication method would be provided in the same manner on
seven different types of websites. The websites types were identical
to those mentioned in the questions for context-based user accep-
tance (U3). Participants of the RBA-LOC and 2FA conditions in the
online shop context, RBA-LOC participants in the social network,
and 2FA participants in the online banking context showed signifi-
cantly higher satisfaction with the level of protection than those of
PW-ONLY.
Discussion: Online banking and online shopping involves sensi-
tive financial data. For this reason, participants had higher demands
on security than on usability in this context, as some 2FA partici-
pants noted:
“With regard to things where financial resources come
in, for example in online banking [...] or online shop-
ping, I think it’s quite good. [...] With things like social
networking, I don’t think that’s absolutely necessary if
you have to enter two passwords every time you log in.
That would be very cumbersome.” (P10)
“[I found it] cumbersome, but with such sensitive stuff
as online banking, it’s definitely justified. These aren’t
applications where it’s about ‘I need one minute or three
minutes’, so you better take the three minutes and then
you’re secured.” (P57)
Besides that, we consider RBA to be suitable for contexts which
involve personal data, but with lower sensitivity than online bank-
ing. Especially in these contexts, RBA outweighs password-only
authentication in terms of satisfaction with the level of protection.
4 FURTHER OBSERVATIONS
Below, we discuss general issues which we discovered during the
study but were not part of a specific research question.
4.1 Smartphone Usage
28 of 48 participants of the 2FA and RBA conditions used their
smartphone to open the email containing the authentication code
(RBA-LOC: 7, RBA-DEV: 10, 2FA: 11). We assume that the usage of
smartphones increased the usability for re-authentication via email,
as participants noted this as well:
“I actually find it quite pleasant, because I can just read
the email on my smartphone. I can solve it right away
by simply taking my smartphone out of my pocket,
opening the email and then entering the code.” (P5)
“[when having your smartphone] it works quite well.
In the ideal case you have your smartphone with you,
where you can get the email right away.” (P6)
4.2 The Deadlock Problem
In the RBA and 2FA conditions, re-authentication was requested
(and for RBA: for the first time after the room change). Following
that, participants had to log into their personal email account to
get the authentication code. Participants using Gmail as their email
provider (which also uses RBA) perceived deadlocks when logging
in: Gmail asked for re-authentication via smartphone. Seven of 32
RBA participants and three of 16 2FA participants left their smart-
phones in room A since they did not expect this re-authentication
being requested. Thus, they were unable to access the authentica-
tion code, unless they got their smartphones back from room A.
We had the impression that this deadlock resulted in a frustrat-
ing user experience. When users perceive such a security mea-
sure as a barrier, we assume that these are likely to disable the
re-authentication, if possible [10]:
“Sometimes [it’s] very annoying, especially when the
battery is flat and you don’t have another device that
you can log in to confirm this.” (P22)
“On Google I was very annoyed [...], because it was a
shared account and I had to find someone who [...] can
tell me this security code.” (P6)
Resolving this deadlock problem while maintaining security for
user accounts is a complex task. Especially when the email provider
uses RBA as well, users will not be able to access their accounts.
Possible solutions to manage this problem can be: (i) More trans-
parency by informing users of RBA and that users might be asked
for re-authentication in some occasions. (ii) Providing an alterna-
tive authentication method which could be solved without a second
device or email account. (iii) Allow users to define “green zones”.
As an example, we assume that a user knows about an upcoming
journey to another country. Then, the user could inform the RBA-in-
strumented service about these specific travel circumstances.
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5 LIMITATIONS
The results are limited to the persons who were willing to partic-
ipate in the study. Also, the sample represents only a part of the
population of a certain country. Based on the recruiting, the results
are limited for young adult persons with academic education. We
sampled in a country where the population is legally obliged to use
2FA for online banking and e-government. Thus, our results are
applicable for societies that are used to daily 2FA use. To ensure that
this is true for our sample, we asked for prior 2FA experiences in
the semi-structured interview (14/16 2FA participants stated they
had). We can not exclude that some results might differ in other
countries, especially the results influenced by privacy views [41].
The results are also limited to websites with sensitive data in-
volved. With a lack of sensitive data, we expect that participants
would likely reject re-authentication.
Although we put a lot of efforts into simulating a real world
scenario, differences to real world usage are still there. Depending
on the user behavior, RBA-based requests for re-authentication can
occur less frequently in daily life than in the lab study. Concluding
that, it is possible that our results regarding the RBA conditions
were more negative than under real world usage. Also, the event
triggering RBA was static in our study. In real world applications,
however, it is possible that the false-positive rate might affect the
RBA user experience negatively. We expect that RBA is not trig-
gered when browser cookies are retained [24]. However, deleting
cookies is a common user activity [36, 45], causing RBA to be ac-
tive. Thus, we assume that the user perception is critical for RBA,
especially when traveling and accessing online services abroad.
We designed the tasks with the primary goal to allow fair compar-
isons of RBA’s and 2FA’s user perceptions. 2FA using another sec-
ond factor, e.g., biometrics, may offer better usability, but the same
would also apply to RBA using the same biometric re-authentication
scheme. The number of re-authentication steps remains the same,
regardless of the re-authentication factor. Also, some 2FA solu-
tions provide a “remember me” option that deactivates requesting
the second factor, or even both factors, for a specific time, e.g.,
30 days, bringing 2FA’s look-and-feel closer to password-only au-
thentication [15, 17, 20]. We see the fact that some services offer
this option as an indicator that users are annoyed by frequent re-
authentication [9]. Again, for comparison and fairness reasons, we
chose not to include a “remember me” function for all authentica-
tion schemes studied.
With our study, we aimed at capturing the users’ understand-
ing and perception of the targeted authentication methods. Since
RBA re-authentication is commonly triggered by location or device
changes, we introduced appropriate actions to support our partici-
pants in their immersion. These actions only serve as a surrounding
setting and the re-authentication was designed as a secondary task.
Also, our collected data relates only to the understanding and per-
ception of the authentication methods, and not to security-critical
behavior, which is potentially biased by role play (e.g., the password
strength). Thus, we are convinced of a minimal role-playing bias.
Participants brought their own laptop to the study to create
a realistic use case scenario. However, RBA’s re-authentication
requests came only under controlled conditions inside room B. For
PW-ONLY and 2FA, the login conditions did not change between
the tasks. Following that, we assume that using the private laptop
did not affect the experiencing of the different conditions.
6 RELATEDWORK
We introduced a new technique with the room change, which has
not been known in usable security studies to the best of our knowl-
edge. Also, no public study evaluating the usability and security
perception of RBA is known in the peer-reviewed literature to date.
Koved [28] investigated risk perceptions in sensitive mobile transac-
tions by surveying participants with mock-up dialogs, which could
possibly also be used in RBA systems. However, the study report has
not undergone peer review, and lacks methodology, demographics
as well as limitations, making the validity of the presented results
difficult to judge. Nevertheless, we mention the study for the sake
of completeness.
On the contrary, there are more studies evaluating usability
aspects of 2FA and IA. We review them in the subsections below.
6.1 Usability of 2FA
Gunson et al. [22] compared the usability of single-factor authen-
tication and 2FA in the context of automated telephone banking.
The single-factor authentication was significantly higher rated in
terms of ease of use and convenience while the 2FA approach was
rated significantly more secure. De Cristofaro et al. [13] compared
the usability of three popular 2FA solutions with an online study.
Their results showed an overall high usability for 2FA. As a possible
explanation, they argued that the participants were not required
to provide the second factor very often. However, we assume this
authentication method to be RBA rather than 2FA. Therefore, it
remains unclear if participants knew the differences between 2FA
and RBA during evaluation. For this very reason, we did a direct
comparison between the usability of 2FA and RBA.
Das et al. [12] evaluated 2FA usability using the Yubico security
key with participants. The security key aims at low-tech users with
interest in securing their online services’ user accounts. Though
they discovered an increase in usability with the key, this did not
result in increased acceptability. Our study results showed that RBA
increased both usability and acceptability compared to 2FA.
Colnago et al. [9] studied 2FA adoption at a university. They
found that the majority of users found 2FA more pleasant to use
when they reduced the number of requested re-authentication re-
quests by activating the “remember me” function. Our study re-
sults showed that the user acceptance increased with fewer re-
authentication requests, which was the case with RBA.
6.2 Usability of Implicit Authentication (IA)
Crawford and Renaud [10] evaluated user perceptions of IA on mo-
bile devices. The results indicated that users deactivated IA if they
were asked to re-authenticate too often. Khan et al. [27] conducted
a two-part study to gain insights into the usability and security
perception of IA schemes. The results showed that participants
felt more secure with activated IA. In contrast to our study, both
studies only simulated the authentication scheme. Agarwal et al.
[2] evaluated four different configurations of explicit authentica-
tion schemes inside IA with a within-group field study involving
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students of their university. Similar to our study, users preferred
different authentication methods in different use case scenarios.
7 CONCLUSION
RBA is getting more and more important for website owners and
website users due to increased security risks such as password
database leaks, intelligent password guessing and credential stuffing
attacks. The importance also increases since RBA is recommended
by NIST [21] and has the potential to increase security for password-
based authentication without degrading usability. To investigate
this potential, we conducted a studywith 65 participants to compare
usability and security perceptions of RBA, 2FA, and password-only
authentication.
Our study results provide first empirical evidence that RBA is
perceived as more secure than password-only authentication and
more usable than equivalent 2FA variants. We found that the user
acceptance of RBA is dependent on the type of website and the
device on which it is mainly used. In general, RBA using email
address confirmation is accepted for websites which store a certain
amount of sensitive data. In contrast to that, RBA using mobile
phone numbers or authenticator apps for re-authentication is less
accepted. Thus, deploying RBA has to be considered carefully for
each use case scenario. Special attention has also to be taken if ac-
cess to the re-authentication factor (e.g., email address) is protected
with RBA as well, since this could result in locking out users.
Regarding the security perceptions, our results suggest that RBA
is considered to be comparably secure as 2FA for a wide range of
websites. Only for high security demands, such as posed by online
banking, 2FA is preferable over RBA, due to the higher feeling of
protection in this context.
Our results indicate that users have a demand for strong security
on websites, especially when sensitive data is involved. In contrast
to 2FA, RBA can provide this security with minimal burden on the
user [51]. This is probably one of the reasons why users preferred
RBA over 2FA in our study and why 2FA has low adoption rates in
the wild [31]. Hence, almost all websites involving sensitive data
should consider deploying RBA to protect their users.
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A WEBSITE
A.1 Additional Authentication Dialog
Based on six re-authentication dialogs, we created a generic dialog
representing RBA state-of-the-art deployments (see Section 2.1). We
categorized the wording and design decisions inside the correspond-
ing dialogs. The wordings and design decisions with the highest
occurrences were selected for the final dialog (see Figure 1b).
Table 4: Ranking the wording and design decisions for the
RBA identity confirmation dialog of our study website. Bold
highlighted: Taken for the final dialog.
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Process
Identity/Login Verify #  #  #  
Identity/Login Check  # # #  #
Two-Step # #  # # #
Additional Factor
Security Code #    # #
Verification Code  # # # G# G#
Email Address Display
Censored/Not shown   # # G#D  
Uncensored # #   G#M #
Authentication code
Six digits   #   #
Seven digits # # # # #  
Four digits # #  # # #
 Present # Not present G# Not in all dialogs
D Desktop view only MMobile view only
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A.2 Additional Authentication Email
For the RBA and 2FA conditions, the study website sent an email
to participants to confirm the claimed identity. The email content
is based on additional authentication emails of six online services
(see Section 2.1).
From: [website] Security
Subject: Your personal security code
Dear [website] user,
someone just tried to sign in to your [website] account.
If you were prompted for a security code, please enter the following
to complete your sign-in:
[Six-digit authentication code]
If you were not prompted, please change your password
immediately in the profile settings of [website].
Thanks, the [website] team
Figure 6: Email, which was sent to the participants
B STUDY TASKS
All tasks were printed one after the other on paper. Participants
were asked to turn to the next sheet containing the next task when
the task was completed.
Task 1
(1) Turn on your personal laptop.
(2) Open a web browser of your choice.
(3) Register on the cloud storage website [website].
The website is available at:
https://[website]/register
Your access code for the registration is: [Access code]
For the registration, please use your private email address and a
password.
(4) Log out after registration.
Task 2
You’re about to have a business meeting with a potential client. You’re going
to give a talk there.
(1) Log into [website].
(2) Upload the presentation and the minutes for this meeting there.
Both files are stored on a USB flash drive, which is located in front
of you.
(3) Log out afterwards.
When you’ve finished this task, please call the study conductor by press-
ing the grey button.
Participant is brought from room A to room B (the “internet cafe”).
Task 3
You are on your way to the customer. Shortly before you reach your destina-
tion, you noticed that you have forgotten your laptop with the presentation
and important data.
Luckily, there is an open internet cafe next to the customers destination
so that you can access your data there.
You are now inside the internet cafe on a computer assigned to you.
You’ve bought a USB flash drive beforehand, which is now located in front
of you.
(1) Open the Chrome browser.
(2) Log into [website].
(3) Download the presentation (not the meeting minutes) for your talk
there.
(4) Log out afterwards.
(5) Save the presentation on the USB flash drive so that you can open it
later on the customer’s presentation computer.
Task 4
Mr. Berner, a business partner of the CLOUST AG gets in touch with you.
He wants to know the quarterly figures (2nd quarter of 2018) of the business
report. You can access the business report via [website].
(1) Log into [website].
(2) Look for the current quarterly figure (revenue from 2nd quarter of
2018) from the business report and send him the figure via email.
His email address is berner@[Company domain name].de2.
(3) Don’t forget to log out afterwards since you’re going to give the
talk afterwards and therefore have to leave the internet cafe.
Task 5
Your colleague Alisa Berger gets in touch with you. She needs a photo of
you to introduce the company to another customer.
The talk is only in 15 minutes and you remember that you can upload
photos to [website] and share them with her. Also, the computer inside the
internet cafe has a camera which you can use.
(1) Log into [website].
(2) Click the button “Take a picture”.
(3) Now take a picture of yourself there which is stored automatically
on the website.
(4) Share this picture with Alisa Berger.
(5) Log out afterwards.
Task 6
You gave the talk. After a short break, a meeting with the potential customer
should take place.
For a good preparation, you have already stored the meeting minutes
on [website]. You have borrowed a tablet PC for the meeting, which is
connected to the customer’s public Wi-Fi network.
(1) Get the tablet PC from the right drawer of the desk.
(2) Open the Chrome browser on the tablet PC.
(3) Log into [website] with the tablet PC.
(4) Open the meeting minutes.
Afterwards, please call the study conductor by pressing the grey button.
Participant is brought from room B to room A again.
2We bought an internet domain representing this fictional company (not linked to our
university) and controlled the email address of the business partner.
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Task 7
You’re at home again where you’ve found your forgotten laptop. Now you
want to delete the data which you no longer need on [website].
(1) Turn on your laptop.
(2) Open a web browser of your choice.
(3) Log into [website] with your laptop.
(4) Delete the presentation, the meeting minutes, and the picture you
uploaded.
(5) Delete your user profile via the “Profile” menu tab.
Afterwards, please call the study conductor by pressing the grey button.
C QUESTIONS
C.1 Modified SUS Surveys
Participants responded on a five-point Likert scale (5 - Strongly
agree, 1 - Strongly disagree). The scale direction varied for a ran-
domly selected half of participants in each study group. The ques-
tion order varied randomly for each participant.
C.1.1 SUS 1: Website.
• I think that I would like to use this website frequently
• I found the website unnecessarily complex
• I thought the website was easy to use
• I think that I would need the support of a technical person to be able
to use this website
• I found the various functions on this website were well integrated
• I thought there was too much inconsistency on this website
• I would imagine that most people would learn to use this website very
quickly
• I found the website very cumbersome to use
• I felt very confident using the website
• I needed to learn a lot of things before I could get going with this
website
C.1.2 SUS 2: Login Procedure.
• I think that I would like to use this login procedure frequently
• I found the login procedure unnecessarily complex
• I thought the login procedure was easy to use
• I think that I would need the support of a technical person to be able
to use this login procedure
• I found the various functions of this login procedure were well inte-
grated
• I thought there was too much inconsistency of this login procedure
• I would imagine that most people would learn to use this login proce-
dure very quickly
• I found the login procedure very cumbersome to use
• I felt very confident using the login procedure
• I needed to learn a lot of things before I could get going with this login
procedure
C.2 Exit Survey
Participants responded on a five-point Likert scale including a
“don’t know” option. The scale direction varied for a randomly
selected half of participants in each study group. The question
order and the order of the subquestions varied randomly for each
participant.
• How satisfied or unsatisfied are you with the level of protection which is
offered by the login procedure?
(5 - Very satisfied, 1 - Very unsatisfied)
• How satisfied or unsatisfied are you with the level of protection of the
the login procedure, if it is provided in the same manner on the following
types of websites?
(5 - Very satisfied, 1 - Very unsatisfied)
# Online banking # Online shop # Email service # Social network
# Online storage (Dropbox, Google Drive and others) # Video-sharing
website # Comment function on a news website
• How annoying or not annoying did you perceive this login procedure?
(5 - Not annoying at all, 1 - Very annoying)
• How much time does this login procedure take according to your percep-
tion?
(5 - Very little time, 1 - Very much time)
• How tiring or not-tiring did you find this login procedure?
(5 - Not tiring at all, 1 - Very tiring)
• How did you perceive the interruptions for confirming the identity?
(5 - Not annoying at all, 1 - Very annoying)
• How do you rate the overall security of the login procedure?
(5 - Very secure, 1 - Very insecure)
• [2FA, RBA] Please rate your agreement with the following statement:
I understood why I had to confirm my Identity a second time.
(5 - Strongly agree, 1 - Strongly disagree)
• [2FA, RBA] How secure do you find this login procedure compared to a
login procedure with password and without identity confirmation?
(5 - Very more secure, 1 - Very more insecure)
• [2FA, RBA] Would you use this login procedure?
(5 - Yes, very sure, 1 - No, definitely not)
• [2FA, RBA] How much would you accept or reject the identity confirma-
tion on the following types of websites, if you would have to enter your
email address for this purpose?
(5 - Fully accept, 1 - Fully reject)
# Online banking # Online shop # Email service # Social network
# Online storage (Dropbox, Google Drive and others) # Video website
# Comment function on a news website
• [2FA, RBA] How much would you accept or reject the identity confirma-
tion on the following types of websites, if you would have to enter your
mobile phone number for this purpose?
(5 - Fully accept, 1 - Fully reject)
Same categories as in the question before.
• [2FA, RBA] How much would you accept or reject the identity confirma-
tion on the following types of websites, if you would have to install a
special app on your smartphone for this purpose?
(5 - Fully accept, 1 - Fully reject)
Same categories as in the question before.
C.3 Semi-structured Interview
(1) What did you like on the website?
(2) What didn’t you like on the website?
(3) What did you like on the login procedure?
(4) What didn’t you like on the login procedure?
(5) Would you change anything on the login procedure?
(6) How was your security perception when you were using the web-
site?
(7) Do you have suggestions for alternative authentication methods?
[If yes:]: Which ones?
(8) [2FA, RBA] Can you explain how this login procedure works?
(9) [2FA, RBA] Can you trace back the identity confirmation to a certain
behavior?
(10) [2FA, RBA] Have you ever come into contact with such a login
procedure?
[If yes:] Where exactly? How was your perception there?
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D EXTENDED RESULTS
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(a) How much would you accept or reject the identity confirmation on the following
types of websites, if you would have to enter your email address for this purpose?
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(b) How much would you accept or reject the identity confirmation on the following
types of websites, if you would have to enter your mobile phone number for this pur-
pose?
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(c) How much would you accept or reject the identity confirmation on the following
types of websites, if you would have to install a special app on your smartphone for this
purpose?
Figure 7: Likert plots showing the responses to the context based user accep-
tance questions
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Figure 8: Likert plots showing the responses to the question “How satisfied or
unsatisfied are you with the level of protection of the the login procedure, if
it is provided in the same manner on the following types of websites?”
Figure 9: Desktop view of the study website
How much time does this login procedure take according to your perception?(U1e)
Please rate your agreement with the following statement:
I understood why I had to confirm my Identity a second time.
How secure do you find this login procedure compared to a login
procedure with password and without identity confirmation?
(S1)
(U4)
Figure 10: Additional responses to the user ac-
ceptance (U1), understanding (U4) and security
perception (S1) questions
Table 5: Kruskal-Wallis omnibus test and Dunn-
Bonferroni post-hoc analysis (p-values) for
context-based user acceptance (U3) of the iden-
tity confirmation between providing an email
address or mobile phone number, or installing
an authenticator app. Bold: Significant, *: 1.000
Kruskal-Wallis Dunn-Bonferroni
Email/ Email/ Phone/
𝜒2 p Phone App App
Online banking RBA-LOC 0.9752 0.6141 * * *
RBA-DEV 1.9903 0.3697 0.6363 * 0.7059
2FA 0.6536 0.7212 * * *
Online shop RBA-LOC 8.5748 0.0137 0.0156 0.0848 *
RBA-DEV 9.2877 0.0096 0.0186 0.0314 *
2FA 4.5662 0.1020 0.1750 0.2134 *
Email service RBA-LOC 8.8533 0.0120 0.0091 0.2209 0.6699
RBA-DEV 5.4381 0.0659 0.0898 0.1929 *
2FA 2.1842 0.3355 * 0.4927 0.7895
Social network RBA-LOC 10.5111 0.0052 0.0040 0.1181 0.7310
RBA-DEV 18.8850 <0.0001 <0.0001 0.0123 0.3964
2FA 8.9550 0.0114 0.0102 0.1377 *
Online storage RBA-LOC 11.5340 0.0031 0.0022 0.4284 0.1547
RBA-DEV 7.0275 0.0298 0.0527 0.0763 *
2FA 2.8976 0.2348 0.5682 0.3321 *
Video website RBA-LOC 11.1586 0.0038 0.0034 0.0606 *
RBA-DEV 16.4038 0.0003 0.0005 0.0030 *
2FA 9.8765 0.0072 0.0084 0.0585 *
News website RBA-LOC 6.4476 0.0398 0.0336 0.4764 0.7553
RBA-DEV 18.8718 <0.0001 <0.0001 0.0015 *
2FA 4.1956 0.1227 0.2334 0.2233 *
15
ACSAC 2020, December 7–11, 2020, Austin, USA Stephan Wiefling, Markus Dürmuth, and Luigi Lo Iacono
Table 6: Results of the Kruskal-Wallis omnibus test and Dunn-Bonferroni post-hoc analysis (p-values) for the exit survey
questions. Bold: Significant, *: 1.000
Kruskal-Wallis Dunn-Bonferroni
2FA PW-ONLY RBA-LOC
𝜒2 p PW-ONLY RBA-LOC RBA-DEV RBA-LOC RBA-DEV RBA-DEV
U1
General annoyance 17.9578 0.0004 0.0560 0.0010 0.0022 * * *
Perceived time 5.3885 0.1455 0.1505 0.6300 * * * *
Tiring 10.7254 0.0133 0.0725 0.0122 0.3118 * * *
Re-authentication annoyance 7.2587 0.0265 0.0331 0.1225 *
Re-authentication understand 1.0736 0.5846 * 0.9594 *
Like to use login procedure 10.1893 0.0061 0.0117 * 0.0260
U2: SUS-Score 13.9371 0.0030 0.0093 * * 0.0523 0.0073 *
U2: SUS: Login
Use more frequently 13.2633 0.0041 0.7633 0.0185 0.0078 0.8362 0.4914 *
Unnecessarily complex 18.5616 0.0003 0.0005 0.0420 0.0026 * * *
Easy to use 12.6901 0.0054 0.0034 0.1084 0.0964 * * *
Need support 2.3167 0.5093 * * * * * *
Functions well integrated 5.6887 0.1278 * 0.5794 0.2395 * 0.6447 *
Too much inconsistency 6.0665 0.1084 0.1024 * 0.7143 0.9288 * *
Quickly learn to use 3.7299 0.2921 * 0.5200 * * * 0.6252
Cumbersome to use 19.6675 0.0002 0.0005 0.0049 0.0027 * * *
Felt confident to use 2.5935 0.4586 * * * * * *
Need to learn a lot 1.8281 0.6088 * * * * * *
U3
Acceptance: Email address
Online banking 1.1443 0.5643 0.8556 * *
Online shop 0.6945 0.7066 * * *
Email service 2.0574 0.3575 0.4573 * *
Social network 6.1693 0.0457 0.1945 0.0580 *
Online storage 1.8262 0.4013 * 0.5307 *
Video website 3.0306 0.2197 * 0.4030 0.3567
News website 11.3867 0.0034 * 0.0029 0.0491
Acceptance: Phone number
Online banking 3.1975 0.2021 * 0.3644 0.3644
Online shop 1.6267 0.4434 0.6720 * *
Email service 2.9798 0.2254 0.2992 0.6091 *
Social network 0.6346 0.7281 * * *
Online storage 4.3858 0.1116 0.1495 * 0.3182
Video website 0.9300 0.6281 * * *
News website 0.4674 0.7916 * * *
Acceptance: App *
Online banking 1.3492 0.5094 * 0.7563 *
Online shop 0.3868 0.8241 * * *
Email service 0.6302 0.7297 * * *
Social network 0.5397 0.7635 * * *
Online storage 0.1353 0.9346 * * *
Video website 0.0880 0.9570 * * *
News website 2.1923 0.3342 0.5509 0.6573 *
S1
How secure in general 22.2597 <0.0001 0.0002 * * 0.0013 0.0017 *
How secure compared to PW 7.0254 0.0298 0.1591 0.0336 *
S2: Protection: General 20.3219 <0.0001 <0.0001 * * 0.0126 0.0113 *
S3: Protection: Scenarios
Online banking 7.1264 0.0680 0.0499 * * 0.6822 0.7232 *
Online shop 14.0265 0.0029 0.0057 * * 0.0105 0.1386 *
Email service 5.2338 0.1555 0.3046 * * 0.3674 0.5903 *
Social network 14.2490 0.0026 * 0.0644 * 0.0014 0.4721 0.3284
Online storage 7.5093 0.0573 0.2652 * * 0.1483 0.1013 *
Video website 5.4783 0.1399 * 0.3389 * 0.2245 * *
News website 0.0853 0.9935 * * * * * *
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